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Disclosure’s	Purpose	
Hillary	A.	Sale1	
	
	 The	United	States	securities	regulatory	infrastructure	requires	disclosure	
of	a	wide	array	of	information	both	by	and	about	covered	companies.		The	basic	
purpose	of	the	disclosures	is	to	level	the	playing	field	–	for	investors,	for	issuers,	
and	for	the	public.2		Although	the	structure	is	complicated,	the	premise	is	fairly	
simple.	 	 Corporate	 insiders	 know	 far	more	 about	 the	 entity	 than	 those	 buying	
securities	or	those	impacted	by	the	sale	of	securities	(a	group,	as	we	shall	see,	that	
is	far	larger	than	simply	investors),	resulting	in	an	information	asymmetry.		Thus,	
requiring	disclosures	both	before	the	sale	of	securities	and	on	an	ongoing	basis	
can	 provide	 information	 to	 diminish	 those	 asymmetries.3	 	 This	 is,	 in	 fact,	 the	
choice	of	the	United	States	securities	regime	–	to	regulate	through	disclosures,	
both	in	the	offering	context	and	on	an	ongoing,	periodic	basis.4			
	 Although	investor	protection	is	the	disclosure	goal	often	touted,	this	article	
develops	the	purposes	of	disclosure	extending	beyond	investors	to	issuers	and	the	
public.	 	 Indeed,	 the	disclosure	 system	 is	 designed	 to	 level	 the	playing	 field	 for	
issuers—	 addressing	 confidentiality	 concerns,	 for	 example.	 	 In	 addition,	 the	
system	 helps	 to	 promote	 confidence	 in	 the	 markets,	 which,	 in	 turn,	 enables	
growth	and	innovation	by	creating	access	to	capital	–	goals	important	to	issuers.		
Yet,	as	importantly,	the	system	also	protects	the	public	more	broadly.		After	all,	
                                                
1	Professor	of	Law	and	Affiliated	Facuty,	McDonough	School	of	Business,	Georgetown	University.		
Thanks	to	Kelsey	Bolin	and	Colin	Pajda	for	excellent	research	assistance	and	to	participants	at	the	
Institute	 for	Law	and	Economics	Spring	2018	Conference,	Washington	University	School	of	Law	
Faculty	Workshop	Series,	and	Andrew	Tuch,	Brian	Tamanaha,	_________	for	helpful	comments.	
 
2	Hillary	A.	Sale,	Disappearing	Without	a	Trace:	Sections	11	and	12(a)(2)	of	the	1933	Securities	Act,	
75	WASH.	L.	REV.	429,	482	(2000).  
	
3	 Hillary	 A.	 Sale	 &	 Donald	 C.	 Langevoort,	 "We	 Believe":	 Omnicare,	 Legal	 Risk	 Disclosure	 and	
Corporate	Governance,	66	DUKE	L	J.	763,	768	(2016).	
	
4	Paul	G.	Mahoney,	Mandatory	Disclosure	as	a	Solution	to	Agency	Problems,	62	U.	CHI.	L.	REV.	1047,	
1079	(1995).	
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the	harms	of	market	crashes	and	other	disruptions	are	not	confined	to	investors	
and	issuers	–	despite	the	fact	that	writing	in	this	space	focuses	largely	on	them.			
Disclosure’s	purpose,	then,	is	to	diminish	asymmetries	and	the	space	for	
fraud,	both	for	those	within	the	entity	and	for	the	public	affected	by	the	entity.		
To	achieve	these	purposes,	 the	system	depends	on	gatekeepers,	 like	corporate	
directors	 who	 are	 assigned	 a	 role	 in	 effectively	 managing	 the	 purpose	 and	
consequences	of	disclosure.		Doing	so	requires	them	take	ownership	of	both	the	
ensuing	internal	discourse	between	the	entity,	its	insiders,	and	its	owners,	as	well	
as	the	external	discourse	with	the	entity’s	public	stakeholders	and	the	public	more	
generally.5	 	When	directors	 do	 so,	 the	 resulting	discourse	 and	 candor	helps	 to	
ensure	the	purposes	of	disclosure	are	met.	
This	 article	 examines	 the	 purpose	 and	 regulation	 of	 this	 discourse,	
emphasizing	 the	 role	 of	 the	 board	 of	 directors	 and	 its	 attention	 to	 public	
stakehodlers	and	the	public,	with	a	particular	focus	on	omissions.		Omissions	occur	
when	 disclosures	 fail	 to	 include	 specific	 required	 information	 or	 when,	 for	
example,	 the	 disclosed	 information	 necessitates	 additional	 disclosures	 to	 be	
complete.	 	 	 The	 article	 proceeds	 as	 follows.	 	 Part	 I	 explores	 the	 purposes	 of	
disclosure	in	corporate	discourse	and	how	disclosure	requirements	are	designed	
to	transmit	information.		As	we	will	see,	the	securities	disclosure	regime	aims	to	
address	a	broad	range	of	issues	--	from	fairness	to	market	competitiveness.		Part	
II	develops	the	omissions	theory	in	the	context	of	the	purposes	of	disclosure,	as	
well	as	explicating	their	role	in	corporate	discourse.		Part	III	turns	to	the	board	and	
its	 responsibilities	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 purposes	 of	 securities	 disclosures	 and	
corporate	 discourse,	with	 a	 particular	 emphasis	 on	 omissions	 and	 candor,	 and	
deployng	some	case	studies	to	develop	the	theories	further.		Part	IV	analyzes	the	
relationship	between	directors,	disclosure	(and	 its	purpose)	and	omissions,	and	
publicness,	 tying	 the	 information-forcing-substance	 theory	 to	 director	
                                                
5	Sale	&	Langevoort,	supra	note	2,	at	788.	
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gatekeeping	 and	 explicating	 how	 it	 can	 result	 in	 more	 thorough	 disclosure	
outcomes	 for	 investors,	 issuers,	 and	 the	public	–	and	 therby,	 fulfill	disclosure’s	
purpose	
	
I. Disclosures,	Discourse,	and	Purpose	
	
	 The	 U.S.	 securities	 regime	 has	 a	 long	 and	 complicated	 history	 with	
mandatory	disclosure.		The	regulations	require	disclosures	both	at	the	issuance	of	
securities	 and	 over	 time,	 with	 a	 periodic	 system	 that	 addresses	 secondary	
markets.6	 	 The	 United	 States’	 approach	 to	 securities	 regulation	 focuses	 on	
disclosure	and	is	not	merits-based.7		Instead,	the	system	is	designed	to	press	for	
information	through	discosures	that	will	allow	outsiders	to	develop	their	own	view	
of	the	merits	of	the	securities.			
In	 this	 sense,	 the	 regime	 deploys	 the	 information-forcing-substance	
theory.		The	premise	of	this	theory,	about	which	I	and	Professor	Langevoort	(along	
with	 others)	 have	 written,	 is	 that	 although	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 authors	 of	 the	
securities	 laws	 was	 to	 focus	 on	 disclosure,	 rather	 than,	 for	 example	 fairness,8	
various	 regulatory	 provisions	 create	 incentives	 for	 directors	 to	 engage	 in	 a	
dialogue	with	management	about	the	basis	for	any	disclosures,	and	to	do	so	prior	
to	engaging	in	discourse	with	shareholders,	stakeholders,	and	the	public.9		Thus,	
the	 statute	 drives	 behavior	 toward	 the	 collection	 and	 development	 of	
information,	 producing	 substantive	 behavior	 (discourse	 with	 officers	 and	
management	and	potentially,	changes	in	policies	and	procedures)	on	the	part	of	
                                                
6	Mahoney,	supra	note	3,	at	1052;	see,	e.g.,	Securities	Exchange	Act	of	1934	§	13;	15	U.S.C.	§	78m	
(2015).			
	
7	Hillary	A.	 Sale	&	Robert	B.	 Thompson,	Market	 Intermediation,	Publicness	and	 Securities	Class	
Actions,	93	WASH	.	U.	L.	REV.	478,	538	(2015).		
	
8	Sec.	&	Exch.	Comm'n	v.	Capital	Gains	Research	Bureau,	Inc.,	375	U.S.	180,	181-82	(1963).	
	
9	Sale	&	Langevoort,	supra	note	2,	at	787.	
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directors.10		Additionally,	requiring	specific	truthful	disclosures	forces	those	who	
produce	them	to	both	ensure	accuracy	and	develop	the	underlying	systems	(like	
risk	management)	that	allow	the	insiders	to	avoid	admitting	that	no	such	sytem	
exists.	 	 This,	 in	 turn,	 supports	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 disclosure	 regime.	 Thus,	
securities	regulatory	goals,	disclosure	regulation,	and	substantive	choices	go	hand	
in	hand.			
The	 goal	 of	 the	 regulatory	 approach	 is	 to	 promote	 strong	 and	 healthy	
markets,	which,	in	turn,	enable	growth	and	innovation.11		To	achieve	that	goal,	the	
regime	charges	corporate	players	(for	our	purposes,	directors)	with	responsibility	
for	 both	 the	 quality	 and	 quantity	 of	 disclosures,	 where	 quality	 concerns	
affirmative	required	disclosures	and	quantity	concerns	any	additional	disclosures	
needed	to	ensure	completeness.12	 	The	latter	 is	the	home	of	the	half-truth	and	
omissions	doctrines.	
	 One	of	the	core	purposes	of	disclosures	is	to	protect	investors.	In	fact,	the	
modern	regulatory	scheme	has	its	roots	in	the	Great	Depression	that	followed	the	
1929	market	crash.13	Both	events—	the	crash	and	the	Depression—	resulted	at	
least	in	part	from	a	lack	of	investor	trust	in	the	market.14		Recognizing	that	no	one	
wants	to	play	in	a	rigged	market	and	that	investors	had	been	harmed	by	market	
                                                
10	Id.		Cite	to	other	pieces	on	information-forcing-substance.	
	
11	Id.	at	525-29.	
	
12	Sale	&	Langevoort,	supra	note	2,	at	768.	
	
13	See	H.R.	REP.	No.	73-85	(1933);	Robert	B.	Thompson	&	Donald	C.	Langevoort,	Redrawing	the	
Public-Private	 Boundaries	 in	 Entrepreneurial	 Capital	 Raising,	 98	 CORNELL	 L.	 REV.	 1573,	 1578–79	
(2013).	
14	See	H.R.	REP.	No.	73-85	(1933).	
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manipulation,15	Section	2	of	the	Securities	Act	of	1934	stresses	that	the	“national	
public	interest”	undergirds	the	regulatory	regime.16		
The	 investor-protection	 goal	 is	 met	 on	 the	 front	 end	 with	 disclosure	
requirements	 that	 address	 both	 required	 disclosures	 and	 omissions.17	 	 This	
disclosure	 regimen	 is	paired	with	an	anti-fraud	 rule,	 the	enforcement	of	which	
plays	a	key	back-end,	investor-protection	role.18		When	taken	together,	the	result	
is	the	requirement	that	disclosures	may	not	be	misleading,	either	affirmatively	or	
through	omissions	or	half-truths.19	 	The	basic	premise	here	 is	 that	 fraud	 in	 the	
marketplace	 is	 costly	 and	 prohibiting	 and	 punishing	 it	 promotes	 market	
confidence.20		Truthful	and	appropriately	complete	disclosures	are	key	to	building	
investor	 confidence.21	 	 Thus,	 disclosures	 allow	 investors	 to	 make	 reasoned	
decisions	 confidently,	 trusting	 that	 they	 have	 the	 most	 accurate	 information	
available.22			
                                                
15	Sale	&	Thompson,	supra	note	6,	at	530.	In	a	message	from	President	Roosevelt	to	the	House	of	
Representatives	in	1933,	the	president	stated	that	the	Securities	Act	of	1933	was	intended	to	“give	
impetus	to	honest	dealing	in	securities	and	thereby	bring	back	public	confidence.”	H.R.	Rep.	No.	
73-12,	at	1	(1933).	See	also	Sen.	Rep	No.	73-47,	at	1	(1933)	(“The	purpose	of	this	bill	is	to	protect	
the	investing	public	and	honest	business”).		
	
16	Securities	Exchange	Act	of	1934	§	2;	15	U.S.C.	§	78(b)	(2010);	see	also,	Sale	&	Thompson,	supra	
note	6,	at	531.	
	
17	See	Robert	B.	Thompson	&	Donald	C.	Langevoort,	Redrawing	the	Public-Private	Boundaries	in	
Entrepreneurial	Capital	Raising,	98	CORNELL	L.	REV.	1573,	1575	(2013);	Sale	&	Thompson,	supra	note	
6,	at	527.	
18	See	Thompson	&	Langevoort,	supra	note	13,	at	1575;	Sale	&	Thompson,	supra	note	6,	at	527.	
19	See,	e.g.,	Donald	C.	Langevoort,	Half-Truths:	Protecting	Mistaken	 Inferences	by	 Investors	and	
Others,	 52	 STAN.	L.	REV.	 87,	 117	 (1999)	 (explaining	 that	 both	 courts	 and	 SEC	 regulators	 require	
people	to	"volunteer	any	.	.	.	information	necessary	to	make	[their	statements]	not	misleading"	to	
avoid	 liability	 in	fraud-on-the-market	cases).	See	generally	Richard	Craswell,	Taking	 Information	
Seriously:	Misrepresentation	and	Nondisclosure	in	Contract	Law	and	Elsewhere,	92	VA.	L.	REV.	565	
(2006);	 James	 D.	 Cox,	 Randall	 S.	 Thomas,	 &	 Dana	 Kiku,	Public	 and	 Private	 Enforcement	 of	 the	
Securities	Laws:	Have	Things	Changed	since	Enron,	80	NOTRE	DAME	L.	REV.	893	(2005).	
	
20	See	Dura	Pharm.	Inc.	v.	Broudo,	544	U.S.	336,	345	(2005).	
	
21	See	Sale	&	Thompson,	supra	note	6,	at	530–31.	
	
22	Id.	at	528.	
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Note	 that	 the	 disclosure	 regime	 does	 not	 prevent	 risky	 products	 from	
being	sold.		Indeed,	the	regulatory	choice	was	to	provide	investors	with	accurate	
information,	not	to	develop	a	regime	where	regulators	determined	the	merits	of	
the	 securities	or	entity.23	 	As	a	 result,	 regulators’	 role	—	even	when	 reviewing	
offering	 documents,	 for	 example	—	 is	 not	 to	 determine	 whether	 the	 issuer’s	
proposed	 business	 or	 products	 are	 “worthy.”	 	 Instead,	 the	 regulators	 review	
documents	 for	 sufficient	 disclosures,	 and	 then	 potential	 purchasers	 choose	
whether	to	invest.24		This	regulatory	choice	arguably	heightens	the	importance	of	
sufficient	and	complete	disclosures	as	well	as	a	concern	about	omissions.			 	
	 The	 “national	 public	 interest”	 referred	 to	 in	 Section	 2,	 however,	
encompasses	 not	 only	 investors,	 but	 also	 extends	 to	 issuers	 and	 the	 general	
public.	 Like	 investors,	 issuers	 perform	 more	 confidently	 in	 a	 robust	 and	 fluid	
market.25	To	that	end,	disclosure’s	purpose	is	to	address	information	asymmetries	
                                                
	
23	J.	Robert	Jr.	Brown,	Corporate	Governance,	the	Securities	and	Exchange	Commission,	and	the	
Limits	of	Disclosure,	57	CATHOLIC	U.	L.	REV.	45,	53	n.45	(2007).	See	also	H.R.	Rep.	No.	73-12,	at	1	
(1933)	(“Of	course,	the	Federal	Government	cannot	and	should	not	take	any	action	which	might	
be	construed	as	approving	or	guaranteeing	that	newly	issued	securities	are	sound	in	the	sense	that	
their	value	will	be	maintained	or	that	the	properties	which	they	represent	will	earn	profit”);	Sen.	
Rep	No.	73-47,	at	2	(1933)	(“care	has	been	taken	to	prevent	the	public	from	being	led	to	believe	
that	the	Federal	Government	under	the	proposed	law	passes	upon	the	soundness	of	any	security”).		
	
24	 Id.	 	For	more	of	Professor	Langevoort’s	work	on	cognitive	psychology,	behavioral	theory,	and	
corporations,	 see	 Donald	 C.	 Langevoort,	Reflections	 on	 Scienter	 (and	 the	 Securities	 Fraud	 Case	
against	 Martha	 Stewart	 That	 Never	 Happened),	 10	 LEWIS	 &	 CLARK	 L.	 REV.	 1	 (2006);	 Donald	 C.	
Langevoort,	Resetting	the	Corporate	Thermostat:	Lessons	from	the	Recent	Financial	Scandals	about	
Self-Deception,	Deceiving	Others	and	the	Design	of	Internal	Controls,	93	GEO.	L.J.	285	(2004);	Mitu	
Gulati,	 Jeffrey	 J.	Rachlinski,	&	Donald	C.	 Langevoort,	Fraud	by	Hindsight,	 98	NW.	U.	L.	REV.	773	
(2004);	 Donald	 C.	 Langevoort,	 The	Organizational	 Psychology	 of	 Hyper-Competition:	 Corporate	
Irresponsibility	and	the	Lessons	of	Enron,	70	GEO.	WASH.	L.	REV.	968	(2002);	Donald	C.	Langevoort,	
Commentary:	 Stakeholder	 Values,	 Disclosure,	 and	 Materiality,	 48	 CATH.	 U.	 L.	 REV.	 93	
(1998).	
	
	
25	Daniel	C.	Roper,	Committee	on	Banking	and	Security,	Report	to	the	Secretary	of	Commerce	of	
Committee	on	Stock	Exchange	Regulation	(1934)	(“There	is	a	relationship	between	fluctuations	in	
the	stock	market	and	unsettlement	in	business	conditions,	based	on	the	fact	that	stock-exchange	
movements	are	apt	to	be	regarded	by	both	business	men	and	the	general	public	as	an	indicator	of	
underlying	conditions.	A	violent	fall	in	the	stock	market	consequently	may	lead	business	men	to	
curtail	commitments	and	activities,	thereby	increasing	unemployment,	while	on	the	other	hand	a	
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beyond	 those	 facing	 investors.26	 As	 Professor	 Langevoort’s	 works	 reveal,	
corporate	Insiders,	like	officers	and	directors,	know	far	more	about	the	entity	than	
investors	 and	 the	 public,	 but	 they	 may	 lack	 appropriate	 incentives	 to	 ensure	
disclosure.27	 	 Addressing	 information	 asymmetries	 thus	 helps	 to	 put	 different	
companies	 on	 a	 more	 equal	 footing	 in	 the	 market,	 with	 the	 comparable	
information	allowing	investors	to	contrast	the	entities.28			
	 This	aspect	of	disclosure	has	at	least	two	roles.		First,	it	helps	to	level	the	
playing	 field	 between	 issuers	 by	 requiring	 all	 of	 them	 to	 provide	 similar	
information.		In	this	sense	the	disclosure	addresses	the	confidentiality	concerns	of	
issuers,	requiring	that	equivalent	information	be	shared	publicly.		Here,	then,	the	
disclosure	 regulation	 helps	 to	 address	 the	 concerns	 of	 corporate	 issuers	 that	
selective	disclosure	might	result	in	a	competitive	disadvantage.		In	that	sense,	the	
mandatory	 regime	 also	 addresses	 fairness	 concerns,	 which,	 along	 with	 those	
related	to	confidentiality,	might	otherwise	result	in	inadequate	issuer	incentives	
to	 disclose,	 a	 situation	which	 could,	 in	 turn,	 produce	 in	 suboptimal	 disclosure	
levels.	The	prohibition	on	material	omissions	also	plays	a	key	role	here,	ensuring	
that	 some	 issuers	 cannot	 take	 unfair	 advantage	 of	 their	 peers	 by	 omitting	 to	
disclose	certain	particulars.29		
                                                
sharp	rise	in	the	stock	market	may	lead	to	expansion	of	business	activity	beyond	the	bounds	of	
sound	economics”).		
	
26	Donald	C.	Langevoort,	Organized	 Illusions:	A	Behavioral	Theory	of	Why	Corporations	Mislead	
Stock	Market	Investors	(And	Cause	Other	Social	Harms),	146	U.	PA.	L.	REV.	101,	114	(1997).		
	
27 Id. 
 
28	Sale	&	Thompson,	supra	note	6,	at	528.	See	also	House	Consideration,	Amendment,	and	Passage	
of	H.R.	9323,	Securities	Exchange	Bill	of	1934,	78	Cong.	7717	(1934)	(Statement	of	Mr.	Ford)	(“Now,	
I	think,	we	have	a	bill	that	will	protect	the	public	by	preventing	inequitable	and	unfair	practices	
and	that	will	in	the	end	prove	beneficial	to	legitimate	operators	on	our	stock	exchanges.	This	bill	
does	 three	 things.	 It	 protects	 investors,	 controls	market	manipulations	 that	 are	 destructive	 to	
values,	and	tends	to	curb	destructive	speculation…[the	President]	is	acting	in	the	interest	of	honest	
business	and	honest	investors”).	
	
29	Sale	&	Langevoort,	supra	note	2,	at	777.	
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	 Second,	disclosure	provides	investors	with	information	to	enable	them	to	
choose	between	potential	investments	which	are	not	otherwise	fungible.30		When	
investors	have	the	 information	necessary	to	make	 informed	choices,	and	when	
they	 have	 confidence	 in	 the	 information,	 they	 may	 broaden	 their	 potential	
purchases	to	investments	that	otherwise	would	have	been	discounted	or	entirely	
foregone.31		The	information-forcing-substance	theory	plays	a	role	here	as	well.		
Categories	of	required	disclosures	mean	that	an	issuer	with		nothing	to	report	in	
a	particular	category	will	stand	out	relative	to	its	peers.	To	avoid	that	outcome,	
issuers	implement	systems	so	that	they	are	able	to	produce	disclosures	like	their	
peers.		Thus,	the	required	disclosure/information	results	in	substantive	corporate	
decision-making	 and	 action	 on	 the	 part	 of	 directors	 and	 management.	 	 The	
resulting	systems	and	disclosures	about	them	help	to	increase	capital	investment	
in	issuers,	including	some	that	might	not	otherwise	have	received	it.		That	in	turn,	
contributes	to	the	flow	of	capital	and	allocative	efficiency,	as	well	as	to	growth	
and	innovation.	
	 Disclosure	is	also	designed	to	complement	corporate	governance	systems.		
Here,	the	idea	is	that	once	an	investor	buys	stocks,	it	becomes	an	owner	of	the	
entity.	 	 Yet,	 shareholder	 owners	 suffer	 from	 the	 classic	 agency	 concerns	
implicated	by	the	distance	between	owners	and	operators.32		Of	course,	the	harm	
from	weak	or	bad	governance	extends	well	 beyond	 shareholders	 to	 the	public	
more	generally.		The	disclosure	regime	helps	to	police	this	space	in	at	least	two	
                                                
30	Sale	&	Thompson,	supra	note	6,	at	528.	
	
31	Nicholas	L.	Georgakopoulos,	Frauds,	Markets,	and	Fraud-on-the-Market:	The	Tortured	Transition	
of	Justifiable	Reliance	from	Deceit	to	Securities	Fraud,	49	U.	MIAMI	L.	REV.	671,	696	(1995).	See	also	
Sen.	Rep	No.	73-47,	at	1	(1933)	(stating	that	the	bill’s	aim	is	to	“protect	honest	enterprise,	seeking	
capital	by	honest	presentation,	against	the	competition	afforded	by	dishonest	securities	offered	
to	 the	 public	 through	 crooked	 promotion	…	 to	 bring	 into	 productive	 channels	 of	 industry	 and	
development	 capital	 which	 has	 grown	 timid	 to	 the	 point	 of	 hoarding;	 and	 to	 aid	 in	 providing	
employment	and	resotring	buying	and	consuming	power.”)	
	
32	See	Michael	C.	Jensen	&	William	H.	Meckling,	Theory	of	the	Firm:	Managerial	Behavior,	Agency	
Costs	and	Ownership	Structure,	3	J.	FIN.	ECON.	305,	307	(1976);	Mahoney,	supra	note	3,	at	1048–
1050.		
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ways.		In	the	first	instance,	mandatory	disclosure	decreases	monitoring	costs	on	
the	part	of	shareholders.33	 	The	result	 is	 the	facilitation	of	 issuer	capital	 raising	
and,	 in	 theory,	 the	 allocation	 of	 capital	 to	 the	 best	 issuers;	 thus	 creating	
substantial	 benefits	 for	 issuers	 as	 well.34	 	 Further,	 as	 discussed	 in	 Part	 III,	 the	
regulatory	structure	also	 inserts	directors	 into	the	disclosure	space,	demanding	
that	they	play	a	role	in	diminishing	information	asymmetries	and	detecting	fraud,	
which	helps	 to	decrease	shareholder	monitoring	costs,	 facilitate	capital	 raising,	
and	diminish	the	impacts	of	publicness.35		In	addition,	the	construct	of	publicness	
—	 explored	 more	 fully	 in	 Part	 IV	 —is	 important	 to	 discourse	 and	 disclosure	
because	it	connects	the	interaction	of	media,	analysts,	and	the	public	to	issuers’	
disclosure	choices.36	
	 As	 the	 2008-2009	 financial	 crisis	 and	 the	 accompanying	 slow	 recovery	
made	clear,	healthy	markets	are	key	to	growth.37		Disclosure	plays	a	role	here	as	
well.		The	disclosure	theory	posits	that	information	promotes	robust	capital	raising	
and	markets.38	 	 In	 this	 space,	 the	 regulatory	 structure	 is	 generally	 focused	 on	
offering	regulations	and	a	wide	array	of	required	disclosures.		The	goal	is	building	
and	maintaining	market	confidence	because	without	it,	 investors	will	decline	to	
invest	or,	arguably,	demand	larger	premia	before	being	willing	to	invest.39		Why?		
Because	when	markets	become	unreliable,	investors	choose	to	put	their	money	in	
the	bank	or	elsewhere,	and	market	liquidity	decreases	as	a	result.40		This,	in	turn,	
                                                
33	Mahoney,	supra	note	3,	at	1051.	
	
34	Sale	&	Thompson,	supra	note	6,	at	529.	
	
35	Sale	&	Langevoort,	supra	note	2,	at	787–88.	
	
36 See	infra	notes	155-175	and	accompanying	text. 
 
37	Sale	&	Thompson,	supra	note	6,	at	527.	
	
38	See	Sale	&	Thompson,	supra	note	6,	at	529.	
	
39	Georgakopoulos,	supra	note	26,	at	696;	see	also	Sale	&	Thompson,	supra	note	6,	at	538.		
	
40	Georgakopoulos,	supra	note	26,	at	696,	707.	
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produces	 an	 additional	 problem:	 	 the	 cost	 of	 capital	 increases.41	 	 When	 that	
happens,	in	theory,	investment	decreases.42		Those	decreases	in	investment	harm	
not	 just	 issuers,	but	also	stakeholders	such	as	employees,	as	well	as	 the	public	
more	broadly.		Thus,	disclosure	regulation	plays	a	powerful	role	on	the	front	end:	
it	helps	to	improve	accuracy	in	price	setting.		Better	pricing	helps	to	allocate	capital	
to	 appropriate	 investments	 which	 helps	 to	 fuel	 growth,	 benefiting	 investors,	
issuers,	stakeholders,	and	the	public.43			
	 Of	course,	all	of	these	arguments	in	favor	of	regulation	have	detractors	and	
counter-arguments.44		Yet,	despite	calls	for	changes	and	overhauls,	the	system	has	
remained	firmly	in	place	–	at	least	in	part	because	market	issues	and	situations	
involving	 significant	 greed	 and	 fraud	 provide	 regular	 counterweights	 to	
proponents	of	deregulation.45		As	we	shall	see	next,	omissions	continue	to	play	a	
part	in	the	debate	about	the	power	of	disclosure.	
	
II. Discourse,	Omissions,	and	Liability	
	
                                                
41	 	See	John	C.	Coffee,	Jr.,	Law	and	the	Market:	The	Impact	of	Enforcement,	156	U.	PA.	L.	REV.	229,	
300–11	(2007)	(discussing	evidence	on	the	cost	of	capital	and	enforcement).		
	
42	See	Georgakopoulos,	supra	note	26,	at	706.	
	
43	See	Sale	&	Thompson,	supra	note	6,	at	527.	
	
44	 See	 e.g.,	 Adam	 C.	 Prichard,	 Self-Regulation	 and	 Securities	Markets,	 26	 REGULATION	 32	 (2003)	
(arguing	that	securities	exchanges	and	competition	should	play	a	more	significant	role);	John	C.	
Coffee,	 Jr.,	 Systemic	 Risk	 after	 Dodd-Frank:	 Contingent	 Capital	 and	 the	 Need	 for	 Regulatory	
Strategies	beyond	Oversight,	111	COLUM.	L.	REV.	795	(2011)	(arguing	that	contingent	capital	and	
preferred	 shareholders	 can	 play	 a	 role	 in	 preventing	 excessive	 risk	 taking	 and	 the	 ensuing	
regulation	that	comes	with	it);	Paul	G.	Mahoney,	Technology,	Property	Rights	in	Information,	and	
Securities	Regulation,	75	WASH.	U.	L.Q.	815	(1997)	(arguing	that	technology,	in	combination	with	
market	intermediaries,	can	help	to	alleviate	information	asymmetries).	
	
45	See	e.g.,	Hillary	A.	Sale,	J.P.	Morgan:	An	Anatomy	of	Corporate	Publicness,	79	BROOK.	L.	REV.	1629,	
1655	(2014).	
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	 Omissions	are	key	to	the	integrity	of	the	disclosure	regime	and,	therefore,	
to	the	other	goals	of	disclosure.46	As	noted	above,	the	securities	regulatory	regime	
is	one	premised	on	information	(and	the	correlating	substance)	through	disclosure	
and	the	resulting	discourse.		There	is	a	thorough	and	ongoing	regulatory	structure	
that	 requires	 substantial,	 affirmative,	 truthful	 disclosures	 both	when	 an	 issuer	
offers	securities	to	the	public	and,	in	an	integrated	manner,	on	an	ongoing	basis.		
A	cornerstone	of	this	regimen	is	that	disclosures	cannot	be	so	carefully	calculated	
or	 cabined	 that	 they	 mislead	 by	 omission.47	 	 Omissions	 are	 not,	 of	 course,	
affirmative	statements	or	facts;	they	are,	rather,	statements	with	facts	or	other	
information	missing.			Their	disclosure	is	required	when	material	and	necessary	to	
make	other	disclosures	truthful	or	not	misleading.48		In	this	sense,	the	requirement	
is	actually	a	prohibition	against	misleading	half-truths.	
	 Half-truths	 and	 omissions	 have	 a	 daunting	 history	 in	 securities	 law	 and	
litigation,	and	Professor	Langevoort,	whose	work	we	celebrate	in	this	volume,	has	
thought	and	written	more	about	these	issues	than	any	other	scholar	of	corporate	
and	 securities	 law.49	 	 As	 Professors	 Langevoort	 and	 Gulati	 pointed	 out,	 the	
omissions	 doctrine	 is	 confused	 and	 limited	 by	 courts	 misunderstanding	 the	
difference	between	duty	(whether	disclosure	is	required)	and	materiality.50		This	
                                                
46	See	generally	Langevoort,	supra	note	15.	
	
47	See	Securities	Act	of	1933	§	11;	15	U.S.C.	§	77k(a)	(1933).	
	
48	Securities	Act	of	1933	§	11;	15	U.S.C.	§	77k(a)	(1933);	Langevoort,	supra	note	15,	at	88.	
	
49	See	Langevoort,	supra	note	15;	Mitu	Gulati,	Jeffrey	J.	Rachlinski,	&	Donald	C.	
Langevoort,	Fraud	by	Hindsight,	98	NW.	U.	L.	REV.	773	(2004);	Donald	C.	Langevoort,	Lies	without	
Liars:	 Janus	 Capital	 and	 Conservative	 Securities	 Jurisprudence,	 90	WASH.	 U.	 L.	 REV.	 933	 (2013);	
Donald	C.	Langevoort,	Commentary:	Stakeholder	Values,	Disclosure,	and	Materiality,	48	CATH.	U.	L.	
REV.	93	(1998);	Donald	C.	Langevoort,	Fraud	and	Deception	by	Securities	Professionals	,	61	TEX.	L.	
REV.	1247	(1983).	
	
50	Donald	C.	Langevoort	&	G.	Mitu	Gulati,	The	Muddled	Duty	to	Disclose	under	Rule	10b-5,	57	VAND.	
L.	REV.	1639	(2004).			See	also	David	Mosma	&	Timothy	Olson,	Muddling	through	Counterfactual	
Materiality	and	Divergent	Disclosure:	The	Necessary	Search	for	a	Duty	to	Disclose	Material	Non-
Financial	Information,	26	STAN.	ENVTL.	L.J.	137	(2007).	
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confusion	recently	came	to	a	head	in	a	case	discussed	in	Part	III	and	on	which	the	
Supreme	 Court	 granted	 certiorari,	 Leidos.51	 	 The	 allegations	 in	 Leidos	 involved	
omissions	 related	 to	 the	 cancellation	 of	 the	 issuer’s	 largest	 revenue	 source,	
contracts	with	 the	City	 of	New	York,	 due	 to	 fraudulent	 billing	 practices.	 Those	
issues	were	 not	 resolved	 because	 the	 parties	 settled	 the	 case	 just	 prior	 to	 its	
argument	and	filed	a	motion	to	remove	it	from	the	Court’s	calendar	and	hold	it	in	
abeyance	 pending	 lower	 court	 approval	 of	 the	 settlement.52	 	 Nevetheless,	 the	
omissions	issues	highlighted	by	the	Leidos	case	are	unlikely	to	go	away.	
	 Under	multiple	provisions	of	the	securities	laws,	private	plaintiffs	can	sue	
for	affirmative	misstatements	and	omissions.53		The	first	provision	that		allows	for	
an	express	cause	of	action	is	Section	11(a)	of	the	1933	Securities	Act.	It	states:	
	
In	 case	 any	 part	 of	 the	 registration	 statement,	 when	 such	 part	 became	
effective,	contained	an	untrue	statement	of	a	material	fact	or	omitted	to	state	
a	 material	 fact	 required	 to	 be	 stated	 therein	 or	 necessary	 to	 make	 the	
statements	 therein	 not	 misleading,	 any	 person	 acquiring	 such	 security	 ...	
may[]	sue.54	
	
As	 the	 language	of	 this	provision	makes	clear,	 there	are	 two	potential	 types	of	
liability.		The	first	clause	focuses	on	what	an	issuer	stated	affirmatively,	and	the	
second	on	what	the	issuer	did	not	say,	or	omitted.55		Section	11	does	not	require	
                                                
51	Leidos,	Inc.	v.	Indiana	Pub.	Ret.	Sys.,	137	S.	Ct.	1395,	1396	(2017)	(cert.	granted).	
	
52	Leidos,	Inc.	v.	Indiana	Pub.	Ret.	Sys.,	138	S.	Ct.	369	(2017)	(motion	granted).	
	
53	 Securities	 Act	 of	 1933	 §§	 10b,	 11,	 12(a)(2);	 15	 U.S.C.	 §§	 77j(b),	 77k(a),	 77l(a)(2)	 (1933);	
Langevoort,	supra	note	15,	at	88.	
	
54	Securities	Act	of	1933	§	11,	15	U.S.C.	§	77k(a)	(1933).	
	
55	Omnicare,	Inc.	v.	Laborers	Dist.	Council	Constr.	Indus.	Pension	Fund,	135	S.	Ct.	1318,	1323	(2015).	
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fraud	or	the	intent	to	deceive.56		Rather,	except	with	respect	to	forward	looking	
statements,57	it	is	a	strict	liability	provision.58	
	 This	standard	of	liability	is	tied	directly	to	the	purposes	of	the	disclosures.		
Section	11	is	an	enforcement	mechanism	for	the	disclosure-based	premise	of	the	
Securities	Act:		that	issuers	provide	“full	and	fair	disclosure	of	information”	when	
engaging	in	a	public	offering.59		The	idea	is	that	when	a	company	is	raising	money	
by	issuing	securities	to	the	public,	it	is	important	to	diminish	the	asymmetries	and	
opportunities	for	fraud.		Section	11	imposes	liability	on	those	responsible	for	false	
or	misleading	registration	statements	to	all	purchasers—regardless	of	from	whom	
(issuer,	underwriter,	etc.)	they	bought.		The	purpose	of	the	disclosures	is	to	level	
the	playing	field	for	competing	issuers	and	to	decrease	information	asymmetries	
for	 investors	and	for	the	public.	 	 In	addition,	the	regulatory	apparatus	not	only	
requires	an	extensive	array	of	specific	disclosures,	it	also	contains	a	requirement	
for	 additional	 information	 needed	 to	 prevent	 what	 is	 disclosed	 from	 being	
misleading.60		Thus,	embedded	in	each	required	disclosure	is	a	prohibition	against	
misleading	half-truths.61			
	 In	addition	to	Section	11,	Section	12(a)(2)	of	 the	Securities	Act	provides	
liability	 for	 misstatements	 and	 omissions	 in	 another	 offering	 document,	 the	
                                                
56	Id.	
	
57 15	U.S.C.	§	77z-2(c)(1)(B). 
 
58	Herman	&	MacLean	v.	Huddleston,	459	U.S.	375,	381–82	(1983)	(citing	H.R.	Rep.	No.	85,	73d	
Cong.,	1st	Sess.	9	(1933)	(Section	11	creates	“correspondingly	heavier	legal	liability”	in	line	with	
responsibility	to	the	public)).	“The	section	was	designed	to	assure	compliance	with	the	disclosure	
provisions	of	the	Act	by	imposing	a	stringent	standard	of	liability	on	the	parties	who	play	a	direct	
role	in	a	registered	offering.”	Id.		There	are	defenses	available,	including	the	due	diligence	defense.		
15	U.S.C.	§	77k(b)(3).	
	
59	Omnicare,	supra	note	49,	at	1323	(citing	Pinter	v.	Dahl,	486	U.S.	622).	
	
60	Securities	Act	of	1933	§	11,	15	U.S.C.	§	77(a)	(1933).	
	
61	 The	 scope	 of	 this	 prohibition,	 of	 course,	 is	 at	 issue	 here	 and	 has	 been	 the	 focus	 of	
considerable	scholarly	writing	 including	by	one	of	 the	authors	here.	See,	e.g.,	Langevoort,	
supra	note	15.	
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prospectus.62		Section	12(a)(2)	allows	purchasers	to	rescind	or	assert	damages	if	a	
seller	 commits	 fraud	 in	 a	prospectus	or	 through	an	oral	 statement,	 and	 it	 also	
requires	privity.		Its	coverage	overlaps	to	some	extent	with	that	of	Section	11	,	and	
it	 like	 its	 Section	 11	 counterpart,	 this	 provision	 does	 not	 require	 reliance.		
Defendants	 do,	 however,	 have	 a	 defense	 that	 allows	 them	 to	 prove	 that	 they	
neither	knew	nor	 should	have	known	of	 the	untruth	or	omission.63	 	Again,	 the	
purpose	here	is	also	to	prevent	misleading	disclosures	in	the	offering	context	and	
thereby	protect	investors,	issuers,	and	the	public.	
	 The	 final	 provision	at	 issue	 in	 the	majority	of	 the	private-plaintiff	 class-
action	 suits	 is	 Section	 10(b)	 and	 the	 accompanying	 rule,	 10b-5,	 (Section	 10(b)	
claims)	of	the	Securities	Exchange	Act.		This	is	the	cause	of	action	that	applies	to	
fraud	claims	for	any	misstatements	and	omissions	on	the	part	of	issuers.64		As	a	
result,	a	Section	10(b)	claim	is	not	tied	to	an	offering	document.		Although	initially	
developed	as	an	implied	cause	of	action,	and	subject	to	arguments	that	the	courts	
could	“disimply”	it,	Congress	has	since	legislated	around	it,	developing	pleading	
standards	and	many	other	requirements	and	thus,	arguably,	firmly	establishing	its	
place	 in	 the	 securities	 litigation	 arsenal.65	 	 Moreover,	 in	 doing	 so,	 Congress	
expounded	 on	 the	 connection	 between	 the	 private	 enforcement	 role	 that	 this	
cause	of	action	serves	and	the	purposes	of	disclosure	discussed	in	Part	I	of	this	
article.			
	 For	a	Section	10(b)	claim,	plaintiffs	must	plead,	and	if	the	case	goes	to	trial,	
prove,	multiple	elements,	including:	
                                                
62	Securities	Act	of	1933	§	12(a)(2),	15	U.S.C.	§	77l(a)(2)	(1933).		Section	12(a)(1)	provides	liability	
for	any	person	who	sells	 securities	 that	was	required	to	be	registered	but	was	not.	15	U.S.C.	§	
77l(a)(1)	(1933).	
	
63 See	 e.g.,	 Casella	 v.	 Webb,	 883	 F.2d	 805,	 809	 (9th	 Cir.	 1989).	 	 As	 a	 result,	 this	 provision	 is	
negligence-like	in	application.		Dennis	v.	Gen.	Imaging,	Inc.,	918	F.2d	496,	507	(5th	Cir.	1990).	
		 
64	Securities	Exchange	Act	of	1934	§	10(b),	15	U.S.C.	§	78j(b)	(1934).	
	
65	See	Matrixx	 Initiatives,	 Inc.	v.	Siracusano,	563	U.S.	27,	37	(2011)	(“We	have	implied	a	private	
cause	of	action	from	the	text	and	purpose	of	§	10(b).”).	
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1) A	material	misrepresentation	or	omission	by	the	defendant(s);	
2) Scienter;	
3) A	connection	between	the	misrepresentation	or	omission	and	the	
purchase	or	sale	of	a	security;	
4) Reliance	upon	the	misrepresentation	(but	not	an	omission);	
5) Economic	loss;	and		
6) Loss	causation.66	
As	 the	above	 list	makes	 clear,	 Section	10(b)	 claims	are	more	 complicated	 than	
their	Section	11	and	12(a)(2)	counterparts.		In	particular,	the	scienter	element	is	
subject	to	a	very	strict	pleading	standard.67		As	a	result,	an	“inference	of	scienter	
must	be	more	than	merely	plausible	or	reasonable—it	must	be	cogent	and	at	least	
as	 compelling	 as	 any	 opposing	 inference	 of	 nonfraudulent	 intent.”68	 	 Most	
importantly,	Section	10(b)	allows	for	issuer	liability	to	investors	for	misstatements	
and	omissions	 regardless	of	whether	 they	occur	 in	 an	offering	document,	 thus	
broadening	significantly	the	potential	scope	of	liability.69	
	 A	 key	 regulatory	 disclosure	 provision,	 Item	 303	 of	 Regulation	 S-K,	
Management’s	Discussion	and	Analysis,	presses	for	narrative	information	about	
the	company.70		In	particular,	Item	303	requires	information	about	known	trends	
and	 uncertainties.71	 	 The	 thrust	 of	 this	 requirement,	 of	 course,	 is	 that	 issuers	
                                                
66	Id.	
	
67	See	PSLRA	§21D(b)(2);	15	U.S.C.	§	78u-4(b)(2).	
	
68 Tellabs,	Inc.	v.	Makor	Issues	&	rights,	Ltd.,	551	U.S.	308,	313-14	(2007). 
 
69	Securities	Exchange	Act	of	1934	§	10(b),	15	U.S.C.	§	78j	(1934).	
	
70	 See	 Leidos,	 Inc.	 v.	 Indiana	 Pub.	 Ret.	 Sys.,	 137	 S.	 Ct.	 1395,	 1396	 (2017)	 (cert.	 granted).	 The	
defendants	 in	 the	Leidos	 case	argued	 that	 Item	303	does	not	create	a	cause	of	action.	Brief	of	
Petitoner	at	14,	Leidos,	Inc.	v.	Indiana	Pub.	Ret.	Sys.,	137	S.	Ct.	1395,	1396	(2017)	(cert.	granted).	
Indeed	 it	 does	 not.	 It	 is,	 however,	 subject	 to	 litigation	 under	 Sections	 11,	 12(a)(2)	 and	 10	 –	
assuming	that	disclosure	was	required	and	that	a	claim	meets	the	elements	of	the	provisions	at	
issue.	
	
71	 17	 C.F.R.	 §	 229.303.	 Interestingly,	 however,	 empirical	 evidence	 reveals	 that	 as	 an	 issuer’s	
situation	deteriorates,	so	does	the	quality	of	its	disclosures.		The	MD&A	becomes	harder	to	read.		
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should	 share	what	 they	 know	 (or	 have	 reason	 to	 know)	 about	what	 is	 coming	
around	the	corner.72		As	Professor	Langevoort	has	so	aptly	put	it,	if	the	company	
has	had	three	great	quarters,	but	knows	that	the	bottom	is	about	to	fall	out	of	its	
business,	 a	 reasonable	 investor	 would	 find	 that	 information	 material	 to	 an	
investment	decision.73	 	 In	short,	although	we	do	not	require	 issuers	 to	disclose	
everything,	disclosures	full	of	gaps	are	useless	to	investors	and	the	public.		They	
also	undermines	the	issuer-related	purposes	of	disclosure.			
	 Nevertheless,	the	half-truths	and	omissions	doctrines	have	stretched	the	
courts’	abilities.		In	effect,	the	challenge	with	omissions	is	two-sided.		The	premise	
for	 disclosure	 and	 liability	 seems	 relatively	 straightforward.	 	 If	 a	 company	 is	
required	to	make	disclosure	under	the	securities	laws,	as	in	the	case	of	the	MD&A,	
then	that	disclosure	must	be	sufficiently	complete	so	as	not	to	be	misleading.74		
Or,	put	differently,	there	is	no	point	in	requiring	certain	disclosures	if	an	issuer	is	
free	to	cabin	them,	through	omissions,	in	a	manner	that	makes	what	is	disclosed	
misleading.		The	same	is	true	for	voluntary	disclosures.75	To	do	otherwise	would	
undermine	the	very	purposes	of	a	disclosure-based	securities	regulatory	regime.		
Thus,	the	disclosure	structure,	with	its	emphasis	on	omissions,	is	designed	to	press	
for	complete	and	accurate	information.	
		 Yet,	a	key	challenge	with	omissions	 is	 that	 there	 is	a	 temptation	by	any	
investor	harmed	by	a	purchase	to	argue	that	more	information	was	necessary	and,	
                                                
Tone	 shifts,	 sentences	 become	more	 complex,	 and	 the	 obfuscation	 of	 the	 language	 increases.	
Donald	C.	Langevoort,	Disasters	and	Disclosures,	SCHOLARSHIP	@	GEORGETOWN	LAW	1,	14-16	(2018),		
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2024.			
	
72	Langevoort	&	Gulati,	supra	note	44,	at	1652.	
	
73	Id.	See	also	David	Mosma	&	Timothy	Olson,	Muddling	through	Counterfactual	Materiality	and	
Divergent	 Disclosure:	 The	 Necessary	 Search	 for	 a	 Duty	 to	 Disclose	 Material	 Non-Financial	
Information,	26	STAN.	ENVTL.	L.J.	137	(2007).	
	
74	Sale	&	Langevoort,	supra	note	2,	at	790.	
	
75 See,	e.g.,	In	re	Hi-Crush	Partners	L.P.	Sec.	Litig.,	2013	WL	6233561	at	*18	(S.D.N.Y.	Dec.	2,	2013).	
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therefore,	 omissions	 must	 have	 occurred.76	 	 As	 the	 saying	 goes,	 hindsight	 is	
twenty-twenty,	making	it	easy	to	argue	about	what	should	have	been	disclosed	
when	 time	 has	 passed	 and	 the	 investment	 looks	 less	 promising.	 	 The	 result	 is	
pressure	to	prevent	every	bit	of	missing	information	from	becoming	an	actionable	
omission.			
The	line	between	the	two	is	tricky	to	draw.		The	trouble	with	omissions	is	
that	because	they	are	not	affirmative	statements,	they	“don’t	exist.”		As	a	result,	
the	courts	have	determined	that	there	is	no	reliance	requirement	for	an	omission	
on	the	theory	that	investors	cannot	prove	reliance	on	something	that	was	not	said.		
This	is	particularly	important	in	the	context	of	class	actions,	where	reliance	might	
well	 be	different	 for	every	purchaser.	 Yet,	without	 reliance	as	an	element,	 the	
claims	are	arguably	easier	to	bring,	potentially	expanding	liability	dramatically.77		
As	 a	 result,	 courts	 have	 cabined	 potential	 claims	 such	 that,	 in	 order	 to	 trigger	
liability	for	an	omission,	the	alleged	misstatement	and	the	omission	must	pertain	
to	 the	 same	 subject	 matter,	 and	 the	 missing	 information	 must	 render	 the	
statement	misleading	by	altering	its	meaning.78	
This	concern	about	the	expansion	of	10b-5	claims	has	been,	and	continues	
to	be,	 a	 focus	of	 the	 courts.	 	 In	 their	 article,	 Professors	 Langevoort	 and	Gulati	
argued	that	concerns	about	increases	in	these	claims	may	well	have	been	at	the	
root	of	earlier	attempts	by	courts	to	 limit	their	potential.79	 	Nevertheless,	since	
that	time,	Congress	has	stepped	in	and	severely	restricted	the	power	of	the	10b-
5	cause	of	action–	developing	strict	pleading	limitations,	heightened	state	of	mind	
requirements,	fee-shifting	provisions,	lead-plaintiff	provisions,	and	more.80		This	
                                                
76	See,	e.g.,	Matrixx	Initiatives,	Inc.	v.	Siracusano,	563	U.S.	27,	36	(2011).	
	
77	Affiliated	Ute	Citizens	of	Utah	v.	United	States,	406	U.S.	128,	152-53	(1972).	
	
78 See,	e.g.,	Kleinman	v.	Elan	Corp.,	706	F.3d	527,	541	(5th	Cir.	2008).	
 
79	Langevoort	&	Gulati,	supra	note	44,	at	1683.	
	
80	Id.	
	
18 
 
higher	standard	means	that	the	10b-5	and	fraud	cases	that	are	brought	are	both	
stronger	 and	 more	 likely	 to	 achieve	 real	 settlements.81	 Thus,	 many	 of	 the	
arguments	that	defendants	and	others	gnawing	at	the	omissions	doctrine	make	
about	the	strike-suit	nature	of	these	class	actions	have	arguably	been	tackled.82	
Additionally,	 omissions	 are	 actionable	 only	 if	 material,83	 but	 here	 the	
doctrine	is	subject	to	confusion.		The	confusion	stems,	in	part,	from	the	fact	that	
the	SEC’s	standard	for	materiality	in	the	MD&A	is	different	from	(and	lower	than)	
the	 standard	 for	 proving	 materiality	 under	 Sections	 11,	 12,	 and	 10(b).84	 The	
resolution,	however,	is	relatively	simple.		Whether	something	should	have	been	
included	in	the	MD&A	should	be	judged	by	the	SEC’s	materiality	standard.		But,	
whether	a	private	plaintiff	can	bring	a	claim	for	liability	should	be	measured	by	the	
appropriate	 liability	provision	for	the	cause	of	action.	 	Thus,	 for	an	omission	to	
result	 in	 liability	 in	 a	 private-plaintiff	 class	 action,	 it	 must	 meet	 the	 requisite	
materiality	standard.85		This	standard	is	set	forth	in	TSC	v.	Northway:		whether	the	
omitted	 information	 “would	 have	 been	 viewed	 by	 the	 reasonable	 investor	 as	
having	significantly	altered	 the	 ‘total	mix’	of	 information	made	available.”86	 	 In	
short,	 if	 the	 market	 possessed	 the	 correct	 information,	 a	 false	 statement	 or	
omission	 will	 not	 be	 materially	 misleading.87	 	 Further,	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 the	
misstatement	 in	 question	 involves	 speculative	 information,	 as	 is	 much	 of	 the	
information	contained	in	Item	303,	the	test	requires	balancing	the	probability	of	
                                                
81	See	Sale	&	Langevoort,	supra	note	2,	at	765.	
	
82	Langevoort	&	Gulati,	supra	note	44,	at	1683-84.		
	
83	Securities	Exchange	Act	of	1934	§	10(b),	15	U.S.C.	§	77k(a)	(1934).	
	
84	Langevoort	&	Gulati,	supra	note	44,	at	1651.		This	was	one	of	the	challenges	in	the	Leidos	case.			
	
85	TSC	Indus.,	Inc.	v.	Northway,	Inc.,	426	U.S.	438,	448	(1976).	
	
86	Id.	
	
87 See,	e.g.,	In	re	Convergent	Techs.	Sec.	Litig.,	948	F.2d	507,	513	(9th	Cir.	1991). 
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the	 event	 occurring	 along	 with	 the	 anticipated	 magnitude	 of	 that	 event.88		
Importantly,	 neither	 standard	 involves	 a	 bright-line	 rule	 or	 strict	 percentage	
approach.	 	 In	 fact,	 it	 is	well	 understood	 that	 any	 percentage	 deemed	material	
could	result	in	fraud	up	to	the	line,	and	that	a	definition	of	materiality	that	is	too	
stringent	would	result	in	the	wrong	incentives	and	the	potential	for	more	fraud.89	
The	courts	have	been	applying	 these	materiality	 standards	 for	decades,	
and	 they	 are	 quite	 straightforward	 –	 whether	 applied	 to	 affirmative	
misstatements	 or	 omissions.90	 	 Moreover,	 the	 standard	 for	 both	 types	 of	
misleading	information	must	be	the	same.		Any	other	approach	would	lead	to	a	
standard	that	creates	liability	for	an	affirmative	misstatement	but	not	for	silence	
that	creates	a	misleading	outcome.91		That	would	be	untenable.		It	would	create	
an	 incentive	 to	 commit	 fraud	 through	 omissions	 and	 undermine	 the	 investor,	
issuer,	and	public	interest	protection	goals	of	disclosure.		It	would	also	diminish	
the	incentives	of	those	charged	with	ensuring	accurate	and	complete	disclosures	
–	 the	directors.	 	We	turn	 to	 them	and	their	 role	 in	disclosure’s	purpose	and	 in	
discourse	next.					
	
III. Directors,	Discourse,	and	Candor	
	 	
As	we	have	seen,	there	are	many	demands	on	our	disclosure	regimen	and	
those,	 in	 turn,	 produce	 demands	 on	 the	 director	 gatekeepers.	 	 Disclosure	 and	
candor	are	interrelated,	and	directors	have	a	role	in	both.		So	far,	this	article	has	
focused	on	disclosure	and	its	purpose.		We	now	turn	to	the	connection	between	
disclosure,	its	purpose,	and	candor,	a	fiduciary	duty,	with	a	focus	on	Delaware	law.		
                                                
88	Basic	Inc.	v.	Levinson,	485	U.S.	224,	238	(1988).	
	
89	TSC	Indus.,	Inc.	v.	Northway,	Inc.,	426	U.S.	438,	448	(1976).	
	
90	See,	e.g.,	Matrixx	Initiatives,	Inc.	v.	Siracusano,	563	U.S.	27,	45	(2011);	Basic	Inc.	v.	Levinson,	485	
U.S.	224,	226	(1988);	TSC	Indus.,	Inc.	v.	Northway,	Inc.,	426	U.S.	438,	440	(1976).	
91	Langevoort	&	Gulati,	supra	note	44,	at	1680.	
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Like	 disclosure,	 candor	 is	 an	 information-forcing	 rule,	 requiring	 the	 sharing	 of	
information	between	officers	and	directors,	for	example.92		Candor	also	operates	
in	contexts	implicating	information	shared	outside	of	the	corporation,	like	when	
the	corporation	asks	for	a	shareholder	vote	on	a	merger.93		Here,	the	Delaware	
courts	generally	look	to	the	directors	to	determine	whether	proxy	disclosures	are	
sufficiently	candid.94		
	 For	 the	 purposes	 of	 securities	 disclosures,	 candor	 presses	 on	 the	
informational	 asymmetries	 that	 are	 internal	 to	 the	 corporation.	 	 Thus,	 the	
fiduciary	duty	of	candor	can	play	a	role	in	addressing	the	challenges	that	directors,	
who	have	limited	time	and	access	to	information,	face	with	respect	to	their	officer	
counterparts.95		The	demands	of	the	disclosure	regimen	press	on	the	substantive	
choices	 that	 officers	 and	 boards	make	 as	well	 as	 providing	 an	 opportunity	 for	
boards	to	ask	questions	and	question	answers.		This	is	particularly	important	when	
companies	face,	for	example,	revnue,	profit,	or	other	challenges.	 	 Indeed,	what	
we	know	from	the	evidence	is	that	disclosures	tend	to	be	more	transparent	and	
complete	when	times	are	good.96		But,	when	a	company	experiences	a	downturn,	
                                                
92	 See	 Donald	 C.	 Langevoort,	 Agency	 Law	 Inside	 the	 Corporation:	 Problems	 of	 Candor	 and	
Knowledge,	71	U.	CIN.	L.	REV.	1187	(2003).	
	
93	See	Lynch	v.	Vickers	Energy	Corp.,	383	A.2d	278,	281	(Del.	1977)	(holding	that	directors	must	
provide	 with	 complete	 candor	 “information	 such	 as	 a	 reasonable	 shareholder	 would	 consider	
important	in	deciding	whether	to”	tender	shares).	
	
94	Arnold	v.	Society	for	Savings	Bancorp,	Inc.,	650	A.2d	1270,	1277	(Del.	1994).	
	
95	Donald	C.	Langevoort,	Resetting	the	Corporate	Thermostat:	Lessons	from	the	Recent	Financial	
Scandals	about	Self-Deception,	Deceiving	Others	and	the	Design	of	Internal	Controls,	93	GEO.	L.J.	
285,	316-17	(2004).	See	generally	Donald	C.	Langevoort,	The	Social	Construction	of	Sarbanes-Oxley,	
105	MICH.	L.	REV.	1817	(2006-2007);	James	J.	Park,	Rule	10B-5	and	the	Rise	of	the	Unjust	Enrichment	
Principle,	60	DUKE	L.J.	345	(2010-2011).	
	
96 Donald	C.	Langevoort,	Disasters	and	Disclosures,	SCHOLARSHIP	@	GEORGETOWN	LAW	1,	14-16	
(2018),		http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2024.	
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disclosure	 quality	 suffers.	 	 Obfuscation	 and	 complex	 sentences	 abound.		
Cageyness	increases.97		
Directors	are	arguably	situated	as	the	gatekeepers	of	disclosures	in	order	
to	 ensure	 candor	 and	 completeness,	 which,	 in	 turn,	 supports	 the	 purposes	 of	
disclosure.		Of	course,	directors	must	trust	officers	to	provide	relevant	information	
but,	as	this	part	of	the	article	makes	clear,	the	SEC	and	the	laws	and	regulations	
place	expectations	on	directors	to	mediate	the	information	asymmetry	between	
insiders	and	outsiders,	performing	an	agency	cost	role.98		Directors	perform	this	
role	through	discourse	and	developing	information	and	substance.	
	 The	 securities	 laws	 and	 regulations,	 along	 with	 various	 orders	 and	
statements	 from	 the	 SEC,	 emphasize	 that	 directors	 must	 actively	 engage	 in	
reviewing	 disclosures,	 thereby	 adding	 to	 the	 information-forcing-substance	
nature	of	the	securities	provisions.99		The	information-forcing-substance	theory	is	
part	 of	 the	 architecture	 of	 the	 Securities	 Act	 of	 1933.	 	 For	 example,	 as	 noted	
above,	Section	11	of	the	Securities	Act	provides	a	strict-liability,	express	cause	of	
action	 for	 misstatements	 and	 omissions	 in	 a	 Registration	 Statement.100	 	 The	
statute	 specifically	 includes	 directors	 as	 defendants.101	 	 They	 do	 have	 a	 due	
diligence	defense	available,	and	it	has	the	impact	of	making	the	claim	negligence-
like	(as	opposed	to	strict	liability	based)		in	nature.102				
                                                
97 Donald	C.	Langevoort,	Disasters	and	Disclosures,	SCHOLARSHIP	@	GEORGETOWN	LAW	1,	14-16	(2018),		
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2024. 
 
98	Langevoort,	supra	note	22,	at	126-27.	See	also	Mahoney,	supra	note	3,	at	1090-93	(examining	
efficiency	gains	of	agency	information);	Press	Release,	Fed.	Reserve	Bd.,	Accountability	as	Chair	of	
Wells	 Fargo	 &	 Company	 Board	 of	 Directors	 (Feb.	 2,	 2018),	
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/enf20180202a4.pdf.	
	
99	Sale	&	Langevoort,	supra	note	2,	at	773.	
	
100	Securities	Act	of	1933	§	11,	15	U.S.C	§	77(k)	(1933).	
	
101	Id.	
	
102	In	re	WorldCom,	Inc.	Sec.	Litig.,	346	F.	Supp.	2d	628,	662	(S.D.N.Y.	2004).	
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These	provisions	are,	in	effect,	a	cornerstone	of	the	information-forcing-
substance	theory	of	the	federal	securities	laws.		Here,	the	due-diligence	provision	
creates	an	incentive	for	directors	to	engage	in	a	dialogue	with	management	about	
the	basis	for	any	disclosures,	and	to	do	so	prior	to	making	the	disclosures	public	
and	engaging	in	discourse	with	shareholders,	stakeholders,	and	the	public.103		This,	
in	turn,	supports	the	purposes	of	the	disclosure	regime.	
The	 statute	 also	 provides	 that	 directors,	 as	 parties	 named	 in	 the	
registration	 statement,	 can	 avoid	 liablity	 in	 two	 other	 circumstances	 arguably	
designed	to	force	discourse	and	candor.	 	For	example,	 if	a	named	party	resigns	
and	 informs	the	SEC	of	the	materially	 false	or	misleading	statement	before	the	
effective	date	of	the	registration	statement,	she	has	a	statutory	defense.104		The	
design	of	this	provision	arguably	urges	directors	to	push	back	internally	and,	when	
unsuccessful,	to	make	a	noisy	exit	–	through	resignation.		Directors	who	have	been	
duped	by	officers	can	also	escape	liablity	by	informing	the	SEC	and	the	public	of	a	
false	or	misleading	registration	statement	after	the	effective	date.105			Here	again,	
the	 defense	 is	 candor-focused,	 noisy,	 and,	 thereby,	 supports	 the	 purposes	 of	
disclosure.				
There	are	many	other	ways	in	which	the	regulatory	structure	has	evolved	
both	 in	 an	 information-forcing	 manner	 and	 where	 the	 role	 of	 directors	 is	
implicated.		Regulation	S-K,	of	which	the	MD&A	is	a	part,	is	a	classic	example.		As	
mentioned	in	Part	II	of	this	article,	the	MD&A	requires	information	about	known	
trends	 and	 uncertainties	 related	 to	 liquidity,	 capital	 resources,	 and	 results	 of	
operations.106		The	MD&A’s	purpose	is	to	provide	investors	with	a	narrative	that	
describes	 the	 business	 from	management’s	 perspective,	 indicating	where	 gaps	
                                                
103	Sale	&	Langevoort,	supra	note	2,	at	787.	
	
104	15	U.S.C.	§	77k(b).	
	
105	Id.	
 
106	17	C.F.R.	§	229.303(a).	
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(uncertainties)	might	exist,	including,	for	example,	changes	in	sales,	revenues,	or	
income.107	 	 These	 categories	 are	 ones	 about	 which	 investors	 would	 want	
information	and	about	which	directors	should	know.		
The	MD&A	is	included	both	in	offering	documents	subject	to	the	1933	Act	
and	in	the	periodic	disclosures	required	through	the	1934	Act.108		The	same	is	true	
of	many	other	areas	of	Regulation	S-K,	including	the	risk	disclosures	required	by	
Item	 503.109	 	 Indeed,	 arguably,	 risk	 overlaps	 with	 all	 of	 the	 disclosures	 in	 the	
MD&A.	 	 Understanding	 evolving	 risks	 to	 an	 issuer’s	 business	 plan	 is	 key	 to	
investment	and	to	the	directors’	oversight	role.110			
In	addition,	all	of	these	disclosures	are	subject	to	liability.111		For	offering	
documents,	Section	11	(registration	statement)	and	Section	12(a)(2)	(prospectus)	
apply.112		For	other	documents,	including	the	periodic	disclosures,	Section	10(b)	
applies.113		As	noted	above,	the	materiality	standard	for	all	three	provisions	is	the	
same:	 the	 reasonable	 investor	 and	 probability/magnitude	 for	 forward-looking	
information.114	 	 Liability,	 of	 course,	 is	 key	 to	 the	 information-forcing-substance	
theory	–	it	is	a	back-end	enforcement	mechanism	for	the	disclosure	regime	and	
                                                
107	S.E.C.	v.	Conaway,	698	F.	Supp.	2d	771,	818	(E.D.	Mich.	2010).		For	example,	Item	303	requires	
that	 “[t]o	 the	 extent	 that	 the	 financial	 statements	 disclose	 material	 increases	 in	 net	 sales	 or	
revenues,	[issuers	must]	provide	a	narrative	discussion	of	the	extent	to	which	such	increases	are	
attributable	to	increases	in	prices	or	to	increases	in	the	volume	or	amount	of	goods	or	services	
being	sold	or	to	the	introduction	of	new	products	or	services.”	
	
108	17	C.F.R.	§	229.303.	
	
109	17	C.F.R.	§	229.503.	
	
110	See	In	re	Caremark	Int’l	Inc.	Derivative	Litig.,	698	A.2d	959	(Del.	Ch.	1996).	See	also	Hillary	A.	
Sale,	Fiduciary	Law,	Good	Faith,	and	Publicness,	in	THE	OXFORD	HANDBOOK	OF	FIDUCIARY	LAW	(Robert	
H.	Sitkoff,	Evan	J.	Criddle	&	Paul	B.	Miller	eds.,	forthcoming).	
 
111	Securities	Act	of	1933	§	11,	15	U.S.C.	§	77k	(1933).	
	
112	Securities	Act	of	1933	§§	11,	12(a)(2),	15	U.S.C.	§§	77k,	77l	(a)(2)	(1933).	
	
113	Securities	Exchange	Act	of	1934	§	10(b),	15	U.S.C.	§	78j(b).	
	
114	TSC	Indus.,	Inc.	v.	Northway,	Inc.,	supra	note	81,	at	448.	
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its	purposes	and,	arguably,	a	key	mechanism	in	prompting	the	discourse	necessary	
to	produce	good	disclosures	as	well.115			
	 As	a	result,	every	disclosure	pursuant	to	Regulation	S-K	requires	that	the	
people	involved:	(1)	ensure	that	the	information	exists;	(2)	confirm	it	is	accurate;	
(3)	 determine	 whether	 and	 how	 to	 disclose	 it,	 including	 ensuring	 sufficient	
disclosure;	and	(4)	disclose	the	information.116		Embedded	in	this	process	is	the	
concept	 of	 omissions.	 	 Regulation	 S-K	 directly	 addresses	 omissions	 with	 a	
requirement	that	any	disclosures	must	include	sufficient	information	so	as	not	to	
make	them	misleading.117		Here	again,	directors,	discourse,	and	candor	play	a	role.	
	 Indeed,	 directors	 may	 not	 “blindly”	 rely	 on	 documents	 prepared	 by	
officers.		Instead,	before	invoking	the	due	diligence	defense,	the	directors	must	
do	a	reasonable	investigation,	have	reasonable	grounds	to	believe,	and	actually	
believe	that	the	registration	statement	did	not	contain	material	misstatements	or	
omissions.118	 	Thus,	 they	must	be	“active	good	faith	monitors”	before	they	can	
claim	 due	 diligence.119	 	 Accomplishing	 this	 requires	 candid	 discourse	 between	
directors	and	officers	and	between	directors	and	those	preparing	the	disclosures	
(experts	or	otherwise).		This	is	information-forcing-substance	in	action	with	one	
                                                
115	Omnicare,	Inc.	v.	Laborers	Dist.	Council	Const.	Indus.	Pension	Fund,	135	S.	Ct.	1318,	1332	(2015).	
See	 also	 Sale	&	 Langevoort,	 supra	 note	 2,	 at	 786;	Hillary	 A.	 Sale,	 J.P.	Morgan:	 An	Anatomy	 of	
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goal	being	ensuring	candor	in	public	disclosures	and,	thereby,	protecting	issuers,	
investors,	and	the	public.	
	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 statutory	 provisions	 that	 contribute	 to	 our	
understanding	 of	 disclosure,	 candor,	 and	 discourse,	 there	 are	 also	 SEC	
enforcement	 actions	 that	 implicate	 directors	 and	 their	 role	 in	 ensuring	 the	
purposes	of	disclosure	are	upheld.120		There	are	several	themes	running	through	
these	matters.		For	example,	directors	may	not	defer	too	much	to	insiders.121		They	
must	 meet	 regularly.122	 	 And,	 if	 they	 fail	 to	 follow	 through	 on	 requests	 for	
information	 to	 management,	 they	 are	 also	 likely	 to	 fail	 to	 meet	 their	
responsibilities	under	the	securities	laws.123	Further,	directors	who	know	officers	
are	 under	 investigation	 for	 criminal	 charges	 and	 fail	 to	 share	 this	 sort	 of	
information	with	shareholders	in	a	prompt	and	accurate	fashion	are	failing	in	their	
securities	monitoring	roles.124		Similarly,	directors	in	a	company	with	a	high	burn	
rate	 need	 to	 know	 if	 there	 are	 liquidity	 or	 credit	 freeze	 issues	 and,	 in	 some	
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circumstances,	update	information	to	shareholders.125		Those	who	do	not,	fail	in	
their	duties	to	shareholders.		In	short,	directors	have	a	“responsibility	affirmatively	
to	keep	themselves	informed	of	developments	within	the	company	and	to	seek	
out	the	nature	of	corporate	disclosures	to	determine	if	adequate	disclosures	are	
being	 made.”126	 	 This	 role,	 which	 connects	 directly	 to	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	
disclsoures,	is	heightened	when	the	conduct	of	management	is	implicated	and,	of	
course,	when	the	issues	are	key	to	the	company’s	survival	or	its	business.127			
	 These	themes	are	echoed	in	more	recent	SEC	enforcement	actions	as	well	
as	 in	statements	by	the	Department	of	 Justice.	 	For,	example,	 in	2000,	 the	SEC	
entered	a	cease	and	desist	order	against	an	outside	director	of	Incomnet,	arguing	
that	she	knew	or	should	have	known	that	an	officer	had	engaged	in	fraud	and	that	
prior	public	statements	were	inaccurate.128		The	order	also	emphasized	the	role	of	
directors	in	policing	fraud,	stating	that	they	must	“maintain	a	general	familiarity	
with	the	corporation’s	public	disclosures	and	accounting	practices	and	investigate	
‘red	 flags’	 that	 come	 to	 their	 attention.”129	 	 In	 addition,	 the	 SEC	 criticized	 the	
directors	for	failing	to	“establish	procedures	reasonably	designed	to	ensure	the	
accuracy	of	Incomnet’s	public	statements.”130		In	doing	so,	the	SEC	reiterated	the	
role	 that	 directors	 must	 play	 in	 ensuring	 that	 disclosures	 are	 complete	 and	
                                                
125	Report	of	Investigation	in	the	Matter	of	National	Telephone	Co.,	Inc.,	Relating	to	Activities	of	
the	Outside	Directors	of	National	Telephone	Co.,	Inc.,	Exchange	Act	Release	No.	34-14380,	13	SEC	
Docket	1393,	1396	(Jan.	16,	1978).	
	
126	Id.	
	
127	17	C.F.R.	§	229.303(a)(3)(ii);	Langevoort	&	Gulati,	supra	note	44,	at	1648.	
	
128	 In	 re	 Rita	 L.	 Schwartz,	 Exchange	Act	Release	No.	 42684,	 72	 SEC	Docket	432	 (Apr.	 13,	 2000)	
(entering	cease	and	desist	order	against	outside	director;	stating	that	“directors	have	a	duty	.	.	.	to	
oversee	the	corporation’s	financial	reporting	process	and	to	ensure	the	integrity	and	completeness	
of	public	statements	made	by	the	corporation”).	The	standard	here	is	negligence.	Id.		
	
129	Id.		
	
	
130	Id.	
	
27 
 
accurate,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 valuable	 role	 that	 directors	 play	 in	 ensuring	 that	 the	
purposes	of	disclosure	are	fulfilled.		These	securities-based	roles	are	directly	tied	
to	the	directors’	fiduciary,	good-faith	obligations	under	Delaware	law.131	
	 The	SEC	also	made	similar	allegations	against	directors	in	the	Chancellor	
Corporation	matter.		There,	the	directors	were	members	of	the	audit	committee	
when	 officers	 fired	 the	 company’s	 auditor	 for	 refusing	 to	 support	 reporting	
suspect	financial	results	and	information	reported	by	the	officers.132		According	to	
the	 SEC	 complaint,	 at	 least	 one	 of	 the	 directors	 knew	 of	 the	 underlying	 audit	
concerns,	but	“took	no	steps”	to	investigate	the	issues.133			The	SEC	accused	the	
directors	 of	 “ignoring	 clear	 warning	 signs	 that	 financial	 improprieties	 were	
ongoing	at	the	company	and	…	failing	to	ensure	that	the	company’s	public	filings	
were	accurate.”134	 	 Indeed,	with	respect	to	one	of	the	director	defendants,	the	
SEC	asserted	that	he	signed	the	annual	report	“without	taking	any	steps	to	ensure	
that	it	did	not	contain	materially	misleading	statements,	…	made	no	inquiry	into	
the	[new	auditor’s]	reasons”	for	the	change	in	position,	and	failed	to	check	into	
several	 related	 party	 arrangements	 involving	 the	 CEO.135	 	 There	 are	 similar	
allegations	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 company’s	 restatements,	 with	 the	 SEC	
characterizing	the	director	as	“ignoring	red	flags	and	never	question[ing]	whether	
there	was	any	basis”	for	the	revisions.136			
	 At	 a	 minimum,	 a	 change	 in	 auditor	 should	 prompt	 clear	 and	 direct	
questioning	 and	 discussion	 (candid	 discourse)	 between	 directors	 and	
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management.137	 	 Indeed,	 in	 order	 to	 help	 prevent	 these	 sorts	 of	 shenanigans,	
management	 is	 no	 longer	 allowed	 to	 serve	 on	 the	 audit	 committee.138	 	 The	
purpose	 of	 that	 change	 was	 to	 increase	 the	 role	 of	 independent	 directors	 in	
ensuring	accurate	and	truthful	disclosures	and	to	prompt	the	exact	sort	of	candid	
discourse	missing	in	this	case.139		In	short,	the	director’s	role	in	the	information-
forcing	regime	requires	active,	candid	discourse	between	directors	and	corporate	
insiders.		The	to	so	engage	undermines	the	purposes	of	the	disclosure	regime.	
	 The	issues	presented	in	the	Leidos	case	raise	similar	red	flag	questions.		The	
claims	were	about	the	company’s	failure	to	reveal	that	a	key	source	of	revenue	
tied	 to	 its	 projections	 was	 in	 jeopardy.140	 	 The	 amounts	 at	 issue	 were	 quite	
significant,	 and	 the	 reason	 for	 the	 contract	 and	 revenue	 issues	 was	 that	 the	
company	had	engaged	 in	an	overbilling	scheme	with	 its	key	government	client.		
According	to	the	plaintiffs,	the	company	valued	the	market	opportunity	that	might	
grow	out	of	 its	contract	with	the	New	York	City	at	over	$2	billion.141	The	City’s	
initial	budget	 for	 the	project	was	only	$63	million;	yet	within	a	short	period	of	
time,	and	due	to	allegedly	fraudulent	overbilling,	the	City	paid	almost	$700	million	
before	catching	the	improprieties.142		These	improprieties,	the	plaintiffs’	alleged,	
put	at	risk	the	Leidos’s	government	contracting	business,	“from	which	it	derived	
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97%	of	its	revenues.”143		Indeed,	the	company’s	annual	report	specifically	noted	
the	 importance	 of	 its	 relationships	 and	 contracts	 with	 government	 agencies.		
Shortly	 after	 the	 City	 became	 aware	 of	 the	 fraudulent	 billings,	 the	 criminal	
investigations	began,	and	Leidos	began	to	lose	government	contracts.144	
	 According	to	the	plaintiffs,	the	directors	knew	about	the	misconduct,	the	
loss	 of	 business	 opoortunities,	 and	 the	 involvement	 of	 its	 employees	 in	 the	
improprieties.145		Nevertheless,	the	directors	allowed	the	10-K	to	move	forward,	
with	their	signatures	and	without	disclosures	about	the	problems.146		Although	the	
arguments	have	their	own	complexities,	the	story	is	similar	to	many	others	of	this	
nature.		Item	303	requires	disclosure	of	known	trends	and	uncertainties	that	are	
reasonably	expected	to	impact	on	a	company’s	sales	or	income.147		Yet,	despite	
evidence	 to	 the	 contrary,	 the	 10-K,	 with	 the	MD&A	 included,	 did	 not	 provide	
information	 about	 Leidos’s	 fraudulent	 overbilling	 scheme,	which	was	 allegedly	
known	to	the	defendants	and	connected	to	a	significant	portion	of	its	projected	
revenue	 growth.148	 	 The	 alleged	 omissions	 thus	 implicated	 the	 directors’	
information-forcing-substance	role.		This	set	of	allegations	also	links	the	disclosure	
zone	to	the	directors’	state	fiduciary	duties.		Directors	focus	on	strategy,	risk,	and	
people.	 	All	 three	of	those	obligations	are	tied	to	the	company’s	core	business,	
revenues,	and	profits.		What	could	be	more	material?			
	 In	response	the	Leidos	defendants	argued	that	because	the	issuer	had	not	
discussed	 the	 issue	 at	 all,	 there	 was	 no	 need	 to	 clarify	 it	 with	 additional	
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information.149	 	 This,	 they	 argued,	 was	 a	 “pure	 omission,”	 in	 contrast	 to	 an	
omission	 required	 to	 make	 an	 affirmative	 disclosure	 not	 misleading.150	 	 This	
argument	is	specious	at	best	and	has	the	potential	to	gut	Item	303.		The	disclosure	
regimen	is	clear:		 if	the	revenue	source	was	key	to	the	company’s	growth,	Item	
303	 requires	disclosure	and	discussion.151	 	 Indeed,	 the	government’s	argument	
was	 that	 reasonable	 investors	 understand	 that	 when	 issuers	 discuss	 results	 in	
financial	reports,	there	is	an	implicit	representation	that	the	issuer	is	providing	all	
of	the	information	that	Item	303	requires.152		In	fact,	this	is	arguably	the	premise	
for	the	requirement	that	additional	information	be	disclosed	to	ensure	that	the	
disclosures	are	not	misleading.		 It	 is	also	consistent	with	the	statutory	mandate	
that	issuers	comply	with	regulatory	disclosure	requirements	deemed	by	the	SEC	
“as	necessary	or	appropriate	for	the	proper	protection	of	investors	and	to	insure	
fair	dealing	 in	the	security.”153	 	Here	 it	 is	helpful	to	recall	that	even	though	the	
goals	of	the	disclosure	regimen	are	broad,	but	at	bottom,	it	requires		a	level	playing	
field	for	issuers,	investors,	and	the	public.	
	 Omissions	are	at	the	heart	of	another	significant	securities	fraud	case,	as	
well:			Ramirez	v.	Exxon.		There,	the	plaintiffs	alleged	that	Exxon	violated	10b-5	by	
omitting	disclosures	related	to	its	recoverable	oil	reserves	and	climate	change.154		
In	 particular,	 the	 plaintiffs	 alleged	 that	 internal	 documents	 contradicted	 the	
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disclosures	 in	 Exxon’s	 MD&A/S-K.	 	 In	 support,	 they	 argued	 that	 the	 issuer’s	
internal	 reports	 revealed	 that	 climate	 change	would	materially	 impact	 Exxon’s	
ability	fully	to	extract	its	hydrocarbon	reserves,	and,	thereby,	negatively	impact	its	
future	 business	 model.155	 	 The	 failure	 to	 include	 this	 information,	 which	 was		
directly	linked	to	the	information	disclosed,	undercuts	the	designated	role	of	the	
MD&A	“as	an	early	warning	device	intended	to	alert	investors	as	to	risks,	trends,	
and	 uncertainties	with	 respect	 to	 the	 [issuer’s]	…	 business	 that	might	make	 it	
unwise	to	rely	on	past	performance.156			In	short,	as	Professor	Langevoort	points	
out,	when	an	issuer	describes	some	risks,	but	omits	one	for	fear	that	revealing	it	
would	damage	the	company,	the	result	is	materially	misleading.		Why?		Because	
the	disclosure	of	some	material	risks	makes	it	reasonable	for	an	investor	to	believe	
that	the	disclosure	was	complete	–	or	that	others	were	not	omitted.157	
	 	
IV. Disclosure,	Discourse,	Directors,	and	Publicness	
	
Like	 Leidos,	 the	 Exxon	 case	 reveals	 both	 the	 link	 between	 disclosure	 and	
publicness,	and	the	role	of	directors	in	managing	publicness.		Recall	that	in	Part	I,	
we	 focused	 on	 the	multiple	ways	 in	which	 disclosure	 facilitates	 capital	 raising,	
issuer	parity,	investment,	and	efficient	markets.		When	coupled	with	enforcement	
and	litigation,	the	system	is	designed	to	increase	the	odds	of	a	strong	and	healthy	
market	 system	 --	where	 fraud	 is	 policed	 and	 punished	 and	 capital	 is	 allocated	
efficiently.158	 	 Although	 this	 system	 is,	 of	 course,	 important	 for	 investors	 and	
                                                
155 Id.	at	*27-30.	
	
156	Langevoort,	supra	note	62,	at	19.	
	
157	Id.	
	
158	Sale	&	Thompson,	supra	note	6,	at	525-29.		
	
32 
 
issuers,	 its	 reach	 extends	 beyond	 those	 who	 actively	 engage	 to	 many	 others,	
including	employees,	stakeholders,	and	more.159		This	is	the	zone	of	publicness.			
	 Publicness	is	a	concept	that	encompasses	the	interplay	between	the	inside	
players	in	the	corporation,	directors	and	officers,	and	the	outsiders,	like	media	and	
analysts,	who	cover	the	company.160	 	Those	outsiders	reframe	and	recapitulate	
information	about	the	issuer	and,	in	that	sense,	they	play	an	important	role	in	the	
public	perception	of	 the	company.	 	The	decisions	 that	 the	 issuer	and	 its	 inside	
actors	make	 can	 have	 very	 significant	 impacts	 outside	 of	 the	 entity.	 	 After	 all,	
corporations	are	allowed	to	wield	significant	economic	and	political	power,161	and	
as	a	result	are	expected	to	consider	the	implications	of	their	choices	in	a	larger	
context	than	simply	the	bounds	of	the	entity.162		Here,	publicness	is	substantive,	
requiring	thought	and	action	on	the	part	of	corporate	 insiders.	 	Moreover,	 it	 is	
about	both	what	is	disclosed	and	what	is	not.		It	is	also	about	how	those	choices	
impact	the	issuer,	investors,	markets,	and	the	public	more	broadly.			
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	 Failing	to	act	with	publicness	in	mind	has	powerful	consequences.		In	the	
Exxon	 case,	 the	 climate-change	omissions	 resulted	 in	 a	 series	 of	 reactions	 and	
ongoing	rounds	of	media	coverage.		For	example,	shareholders	filed	claims	against	
the	company,	officers,	and	directors	for	securities	law	violations.163		Stakeholders,	
like	 scientists	 and	 states,	 reacted	 strongly	with	 concerns	 about	 the	 company’s	
failure	to	disclose	its	own	climate	change	concerns.164		The	SEC,	multiple	attorneys	
general,	 and	 various	municipalities	began	 to	 investigate	 the	 company	over	 the	
omissions.	 	 Thus,	 the	 media	 attention,	 a	 form	 of	 publicness,	 resulted	 in	
investagions	and	further	attempts	to	regulate	and	control	the	company’s	business	
decisions,	additional	layers	of	publicness.165			
	 Exxon	then	struck	back,	countersuing	the	public	officials,	arguing	that	they	
had	 engaged	 in	 a	 politically-motivated	 consipiracy	 to	 violate	 its	 free	 speech	
rights.166		A	federal	judge	threw	this	case	out,	calling	Exxon’s	theory	“implausible”	
and	described	it	as	running	“roughshod	over	the	adage	that	the	best	defense	is	a	
good	offense.”167		The	result	is	an	additional	wave	of	bad	publicity	that	makes	the	
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company	look	like	a	bully.		In	addition,	the	negative	public	opinon	of	the	company	
and	its		dishonesty	arguably	worsened.			
	 Moreover,	the	attorneys	general	involved	in	the	litigation	are	now	seeking	
documents	from	Exxon	going	as	far	back	as	1976	to	determine	what	the	company	
knew	about	 climate	 change	 and	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions.168	 	 They	 also	want	
documents	 concerning	 investor	 communications	 on	 climate	 change	 as	 well	 as	
communications	with	 groups	 associated	with	 “climate	 skepticism.”169	 	 In	 some	
cases,	 the	attorneys	 general	 involved	are	arguing	 that	 their	 states	 face	 serious	
costs	to	address	climate	change,	and	oil	companies	should	help	foot	the	bill.170	For	
its	part,	Exxon	has	adopted	a	strong	stance	 in	the	 litigation	and	 is	alleging	that	
there	are	multiple	conspiracies	against	it.171	In	short,	the	climate	change	omissions	
and	the	lawsuit	produced	a	classic	publicness	cycle.172			
How	did	this	happen?		At	least	in	part,	the	Exxon	case,	like	Leidos,	may	be	
the	result	of	blind	spots	as	well	as	a	failure	of	the	directors	to	engage	and	manage,	
ex	 ante,	with	 publicness	 in	mind.	 	 Indeed,	 both	 examples	 reveal	why	 ensuring	
complete	disclosures	matters.		Recall	that	the	purpose	of	these	disclosures	is	to	
protect	investors,	issuers,	and	the	public	as	well	as	to	ensure	fair	dealing	in	the	
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security.173	Omissions	undercut	the	value	of	the	disclosures	and	thus	erode	the	
purposes.		Thus,	omissions	matter	to	investors,	to	stakeholders,	to	markets,	to	the	
public,	and	to	other	issuers.		As	the	SEC	stated,	disclosures	under	303	are	required,	
and	by	implication	(and	by	rule),	investors	(and	the	market	as	well	as	stakeholders)	
should	 be	 able	 to	 assume	 that	 the	 required	 relevant	 information	 has	 been	
disclosed	in	an	omission-free	manner.174			
Directors	have	 a	 crucial	 role	 to	play	here:	 	 developing	 candid	discourse	
within	the	corporation	before	the	disclosures	and	the	external	discourse	occur.		As	
Professor	 Langevoort’s	 work	 on	 behavioral	 theory	 in	 corporations	 reveals,	
directors	must	foster	open,	truthful	relationships	with	management	to	combat	the	
structural	 asymmetry	 that	 may	 increase	 managers’	 incentives	 to	 suppress	
negative	 information	about	the	day-to-day	operations	of	 the	corporation	when	
communicating	 with	 the	 board.	 175	 Those	 choices	 by	 management,	 of	 course,	
violate	 candor	 requirements	 and,	 thereby,	 undercut	 the	 very	 purposes	 of	
disclosure.	
The	recent	litigation	over	the	Wells	Fargo	cross-sell	strategy	and	resulting	
scandal	provides	just	such	an	example	of	failed	discourse,	candor,	and	disclosure.		
At	 issue	with	Wells	was	 its	 failure	 to	 tell	 shareholders	about	growing	 legal	and	
other	 issues.	 	Like	Leidos	and	Exxon,	the	plaintiffs	 in	the	Wells	 litigation	argued	
that	the	company	did	not	disclose	sales	practice	issues	in	its	SEC	filings.		Yet,	the	
“fake-accounts	scandal	 turned	out	 to	be	a	seminal	moment	 for	 [the	company],	
tarnishing	[its]	reputation	and	upending	its	management	team.176	
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The	 role	 of	 the	 directors	 in	 this	 scandal	 has	 been	 the	 subject	 of	
Congressional	 hearings,	 SEC	 questions,	 private-plaintiffs’	 litigation,	 and	 even	
consent	decrees	from	the	Federal	Reserve.		At	the	heart	of	the	scandal	was	the	
company’s	key	strategy	and	growth	mechanism	–	its	cross-sell	program,	which,	it	
turned	out,	was	premised	on	fraud.		The	fraud	and	cultural	issues	at	the	company	
were	 so	 widespread,	 that	 the	 regulators	 have	 taken	 the	 board	 to	 task	 for	 its	
failures	to	challenge	managements’	assertions.		Indeed,	according	to	the	Federal	
Reserve,	management	reports	to	the	board	“generally	lacked	detail	and	were	not	
accompanied	by	concrete	action	plans	and	metrics	to	track	plan	performance.”177		
The	 board	 should	 have	 caught	 this.	 	 And,	 as	 a	 result,	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	
instructed	 the	 board	 to	 “strengthen	 …	 oversight	 of	 the	 firm	 and	 senior	
management.”178			
Of	course	this	scandal	harmed	the	bank’s	shareholders.	 	Yet,	 like	in	 	the	
Leidos	 and	 Exxon	 situations,	 the	 harms	 extend	 beyond	 investors	 to	
customers/clients	 and	 employees.	 	 Further,	 like	 the	 2008-2009	 financial	 crisis,	
bank	scandals	have	the	potential	to	cause	harm	to	the	public	as	well.		For	Wells,	
the	result	has	been	billions	in	settlements	and	serious	limitations	on	its	business.		
The	process	of	publicness	has	thus	resulted	in	some	powerful	forms	of	substantive	
publicness,	including,	for	example,	limits	on	the	bank’s	ability	to	grow	its	assets	
and	a	timetable	for	it	to	appoint	new	directors.		It	also	faces	ongoing	scrutiny	in	
the	form	of	requirements	for	it	to	submit	certain	plans	for	regulator	approval.179	
The	Federal	Reserve	also	required	the	directors	to	sign	the	consent	order,	making	
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clear	 its	 view	of	 their	 role.180	 	 Their	 failures	 include	 a	 lack	 of	 candid	 discourse	
within	the	boardroom	and	with	the	officers	–	a	key	role	of	directors	that,	when	
successfully	executed	helps	to	ensure	that	the	purpose	of	disclosure	is	fulfilled,	
with	sufficient	attention	to	publicness.	
	
Conclusion.	
	
The	purpose	of	securities	disclosures	 is	 to	 increase	the	accountability	of	
the	issuer	and,	thereby,	to	protect	issuers,	investors,	and	the	public.		Indeed,	for	
many	of	the	reasons	delineated	in	Part	I,	the	incentives	of	issuers	to	disclose	are	
insufficient	due	to	confidentiality	and	other	concerns.		As	a	result,	we	mandate	a	
disclosure	 regimen	and	 insert	directors	 into	 it	 to	play	a	 key	gatekeeper	 role	 in	
ensuring	 the	 accuracy	 of	 disclosures,	 including	 pressure	 testing	 for	 omissions.		
Here	 is	 where	 discourse	 and	 candor	 come	 into	 play.	 	 They	 are	 part	 of	 the	
information-forcing-substance	 regime,	 which	 is	 a	 product	 of	 both	 federal	
securities	 laws	 and	 state	 fiduciary	 duties.	 	 When	 it	 works,	 it	 increases	 the	
accountability	of	management	and	the	directors	–to	investors,	to	the	markets,	and	
to	the	public	more	generally.181	 	 Indeed,	as	designated	securities	monitors,	 the	
regulatory	goal	is	for	directors	to	take	ownership	of	disclosures	by	engaging	with	
management	 and	 ensuring	 accuracy.182	 	 If	 they	 do	 so,	 they	 help	 to	 fulfill	
disclosure’s	 purpose.	 	 Yet,	 to	 do	 so	 effectively,	 directors	must	 both	 engage	 in	
discourse	and	understand	publicness	and	 its	potential	 impact	on	 the	company.		
They	must	 understand	 how	 their	 role	 connects	 to	 the	 entity’s	 boundaries	 and	
private	status,	as	well	as	 to	 its	public	obligations,	publicness,	and	social	 license	
more	 broadly.183	 	 Indeed,	 developing	 this	 understanding	 and	 engaging	 in	 the	
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discourse	will	help	to	increase	securities	monitoring.		In	this	sense	then,	discourse	
and	candor	increase		regulatory	compliance.		In	short,	pressure	testing	and	candor	
will	 produce	 better,	 more	 complete,	 and	 balanced	 disclosure	 outcomes	 for	
investors,	issuers,	and	the	public	–	and	thus,	fulfill	disclosure’s	purpose.	
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